The Dual Face of the American Jury: The Antiauthoritarian and Antimajoritarian Hero and Villain in American Law and Legal Scholarship by Eilbaum, Stacey P.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 98
Issue 3 March 2013 Article 4
The Dual Face of the American Jury: The
Antiauthoritarian and Antimajoritarian Hero and
Villain in American Law and Legal Scholarship
Stacey P. Eilbaum
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stacey P. Eilbaum, The Dual Face of the American Jury: The Antiauthoritarian and Antimajoritarian Hero and Villain in American Law and
Legal Scholarship, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 711 (2013)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol98/iss3/4
NOTE
THE DUAL FACE OF THE AMERICAN JURY: THE
ANTIAUTHORITARIAN AND ANTIMAJORITARIAN




1. JURY NULLIFICATION BACKGROUND ....................... .715
11. UTILITARIAN AND SAFETY-VALVE VIEWS OF JURY
AUTHORITY ............................................. 716
A. A Utilitarian View of Jury Authority................. 717
B. A Safety-Valve View of Jury Authority ............... .719
III. THE DUAL CHARACTER OF THE JURY IN JUDICIAL
O PINIONS ............................................... 721
A. The Jury as Antiauthoritarian ....................... 722
B. The Jury as Antimajoritarian........................ 725
IV. TENSION BETWEEN ANTIAUTHORITARIAN AND
ANTIMAJORITARIAN CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE JURY ..... .726
A. The Judge as Objective, Privileged Decider of Law.. 727
B. A Whiggish View of Jury Nullification............... 728
C. The Judge-Led Movement to Restrict the Jury Power
as Fox Guarding the Henhouse............... ...... 730
V. COMMENTATOR AND DiSTRICT COURT RELIANCE ON NON-
NULLIFICATION OPINIONS ................................ 731
VI. FUNCTIONALIST BALANCING VERSUS A FORMALIST BRIGHT-
LINE RULE .............................................. 734
VII. BRIDGING THE RHETORICAL DIVIDE ....................... 739
CONCLUSION ................................................... 741
t B.S., Policy Analysis and Management, Cornell University, 2010. J.D. Candidate,
Cornell Law School, 2013. Articles Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 98. Special thanks
to Professor McSweeney for his insightful feedback in conceptualizing this Note and the
editing team at Cornell Law Review-specifically Lisa Zhang, Katherine Ensler, Alison Car-
rizales, and Milson Yu-for their hard work. I am forever grateful to my parents, Michael
and Michelle, for their untiring love and support, and my sister, Risa, for showing me what
hard work really means.
711
712 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:711
INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifty years, the Supreme Court has extended and
elucidated the right to trial byjury.1 A handful of commentators have
argued that modern Supreme Court decisions signal a shift in the
Court's jurisprudence on the jury toward a more functionalist ap-
proach that is sensitive to the competencies ofjuries and their historic
role as protectors of liberty in American democracy.2 Consequently,
some commentators have argued that circuit courts should follow the
Supreme Court's lead by leaving behind the formalist distinction be-
tween the judge's law-finding and jury's fact-finding authority that
courts have made since the late nineteenth century.3 This shift, some
commentators argue, would give the jury more authority to decide
questions of law and may even pave the way for the jury's right to
nullify the law as instructed by the judge.4
I See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305, 313 (2004) (citing Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)) (affirming the jury's right to decide "all facts legally
essential to the punishment"); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (incorporat-
ing the jury-trial right against the states).
2 See United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 437-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ("[C]ourts
must now interpret Sixth Amendment questions in light of the jury's role in colonial times,
when juries knew of-or were informed by the court of-the applicable sentences and had
the recognized ability to dispense mercy."); Lance Cassak & Milton Heumann, Old Wine in
New Bottles: A Reconsideration of Informing Jurors About Punishment in Determinate- and
Mandatory-Sentencing Cases, 4 RUTGERSJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 411, 483 (2007) (arguing that re-
cent Supreme Court decisions on jury sentencing espouse "principles or grounds for fur-
ther expansion of the role of the jury"); Arie M. Rubenstein, Note, Verdicts of Conscience:
Nullification and the Modern Jury Trial, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 959, 975-77 (2006) (arguing that
the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan marked an end to the Court's century-old formal-
istic jurisprudence on the jury); see also David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited: Why
the Court Should Instruct the Jury of Its Nullification Right, 33 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 89, 91 (1995)
("[Tihe question of whether to instruct thejury of its power to acquit against the weight of
the evidence must be resolved through consideration of the benefits and harms that such
an instruction would produce."); Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law,
81 MINN. L. REv. 1149, 1154, 1170 (1997) ("[O]ur conception of the rule of law has been
considerably revised in recent decades and has, at least for many scholars and lawyers,
largely shed the unpersuasive formalist and positivist premises on which descriptions of
nullification are often based.").
3 See United States v. Polouizzi, 687 F. Supp. 2d 133, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (arguing
that the Second Circuit's antinullification decision in United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606,
615 (2d Cir. 1997), is no longer "in step with current Supreme Court practice on the Sixth
Amendment," and that therefore the Second Circuit should move beyond Thomas by rec-
ognizing that certain circumstances require judges to inform juries of mandatory mini-
mum sentences at the guilt phase); Cassak & Heumann, supra note 2, at 483.
4 See Robert E. Korroch & Michael J. Davidson, Jury Nullification: A CallforJustice or an
Invitation to Anarchy , 139 MIL. L. REv. 131, 137 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
recent "line of decisions can be interpreted as suggesting that the Court supports the infu-
sion of community sentiments in jury verdicts, and would sanction occasional jury verdicts
that conflicted with unfair laws or oppressive prosecutorial practices"); Rubenstein, supra
note 2, at 960 ("During the nineteenth century[,] ... the Court condemned jury nullifica-
tion, and lower courts continue to depend on those decisions today. However, in modem
times the Court has indicated that the boundaries of the right to a jury trial should be
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This Note argues that because judicial treatment of the jury dif-
fers drastically depending on whether courts address a question of
jury nullification directly or a question of the right to trial by jury
more generally, judges construct complex and contradictory images
of the jury that have led to confusion and tension in the jury nullifica-
tion debate. It proposes a framework for understanding the jury nulli-
fication debate in which judicial characterizations of the jury are
shrouded in antiauthoritarian and antimajoritarian rhetoric. This
framework illustrates how judges construct antiauthoritarian images
of the jury by describing the jury as a representative body that protects
defendants against potential abuse and oppression by prosecutors and
judges, and antimajoritarian images of the jury by describing the jury
as a rogue minority that undermines the law enacted by a publicly
elected, representative legislature.5 More importantly, it explains how
these seemingly contradictory characterizations of the jury are not
merely the product of haphazard or nonsensible judicial flip-flopping,
but are the product of deliberate judicial construction that varies di-
rectly with the legal issues that courts address. Thus, when courts ad-
dress a defendant's right to trial by jury where the issue of jury
nullification is not before them, they are likely to expound on the
antiauthoritarian virtues of the jury and the importance of the jury as
a check on biased judges and arbitrary prosecutors. By contrast, when
courts address the issue of whether a jury has a right to decide ques-
tions of law or "nullify" the law with an acquittal, they are likely to
emphasize the antimajoritarian character of the jury by describing the
danger of 'jury lawlessness" and the fear that juries will undo the laws
made by publicly elected legislatures.6 This dichotomy in judicial
characterization suggests that both the Supreme Court and appellate
courts continue to take a legal formalist approach to their jurispru-
dence on the jury when they deal with issues of jury nullification de-
spite non-nullification opinions that might suggest a shift toward a
more functionalist approach to the jury's authority.
constructed around considerations of the jury's purpose. This newer, functionalist concep-
tion of the jury's role is more compatible with nullification.").
5 Compare Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155 ("The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and
State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be
enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in
order to prevent oppression by the Government."), with Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51,
101 (1895) ("Public and private safety alike would be in peril, if the principle be estab-
lished that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law as expounded to them
by the court and become a law unto themselves."), and United States v. Washington, 705
F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ("Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due
process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power.").
6 United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969) (quoting Roscoe
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. REv. 12, 18 (1910)) (warning that nullifi-
cation instructions would encourage "[jiury lawlessness" and sacrifice the "rule of law" to
the "rule of lawlessness").
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Part I of this Note introduces the jury nullification debate. Part II
describes the law- and fact-finding roles of early colonial and Ameri-
can juries. It introduces utilitarian and "safety-valve" views of the
jury's authority thatjudges invoke to justify their holdings injury nulli-
fication cases, and explains how these views reflect functionalist and
formalist approaches to determining the scope of the jury's authority.
Part III introduces a framework for understanding judicial opinions
on the jury's authority, whereby courts characterize the jury as an-
tiauthoritarian or antimajoritarian depending on whether the issue of
jury nullification is directly before them. Specifically, courts classify
the jury as an antiauthoritarian protector of liberty when the issue of
jury nullification is not before them and as an antimajoritarian threat
to democracy when it is. By dissectingJudge Harold Leventhal's influ-
ential United States v. Dougherty opinion,7 Part IV demonstrates how
Judge Leventhal uses utilitarian balancing to minimize the modem
salience of the jury's historical antiauthoritarian strand and justify the
jury's power to nullify the law, as instructed by the trial judge, as an act
contrary to the rule of law instead of a routine mechanism of the
jury's democratic participation in the criminal justice system. It shows
how despite Judge Leventhal's reliance on utilitarian balancing, his
functionalist analysis is merely a rhetorical tool through which he
weaves the antiauthoritarian strand of the jury's history into a story
that justifies the sharp demarcation that modern courts draw between
the judge's law-finding and the jury's fact-finding authority. Thus,
Part IV posits that his opinion is consistent with a formalist jurispru-
dence to which the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have ad-
hered on jury nullification issues.
Part V discusses how courts' dual characterization of the jury as
antiauthoritarian and antimajoritarian creates confusion in the jury
nullification debate. It discusses how judges and commentators may
mistakenly rely on utilitarian balancing to argue for a broader scope
of the jury's authority by citing judicial opinions in non-nullification
cases where courts praise the jury's antiauthoritarian characteristics.
Part VI concludes that judges and commentators who argue for an
expansion of the jury's authority by referencing the emphatic an-
tiauthoritarian language in non-nullification opinions will likely meet
reversal or make inaccurate predictions about future court behavior
because they overlook the centrality of the jury's antimajoritarian
character and the formalistic view of the jury's authority espoused by
cases that directly address jury nullification. It explains that the fault
with these arguments is not the empirical foundations of their as-
sumptions about the relative competencies of judges and jurors, per
7 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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se, but the fact that the predominant "safety-valve" view of the jury's
authority creates a bright-line rule in which all questions of law are
determined by the judge and all questions of fact are determined by
the jury." Part VI suggests that a formalist jurisprudence on the jury
may cabin the jury's authority excessively and discourage the use of
jury instructions that could produce more just verdicts. Lastly, Part
VII emphasizes the importance of bridging the rhetorical divide in the
jury nullification debate and suggests that proponents of a more ex-
pansive role for the jury can enhance the quality of their arguments by
directly confronting the divide.
I
JURY NULLIFICATION BACKGROUND
Under most definitions of the term, "jury nullification" occurs
when a jury acquits a defendant who it believes "is guilty under the
law."9 The term, however, is an umbrella term for many different
types of jury behavior.10 Darryl Brown delineates four categories of
jury nullification: nullification in response to norm violations, nullifi-
cation in response to biased or unjust applications of law, nullification
in response to uncorrected rule violations, and nullification to uphold
illegal and immoral community norms." In the first category, the jury
acquits because it believes the law is "fundamentally unjust."' 2 In the
second category, the jury acquits because it believes conviction would
result in an "unjust application of an otherwise just law."13 In the
third category, the jury acquits to avoid sanctioning egregious state
conduct with a guilty verdict.'4 And in the fourth category, the jury
acquits because it holds a bias for the defense or against the prosecu-
tion.15 Acquittals of white civil-rights violators by all-white juries are
emblematic of this last category ofjury nullification.' 6 For Brown, this
category is the only one that is inconsistent with "the rule of law" be-
cause the jury's acquittal is based on prejudice rather than a conscien-
tious objection to the law or the behavior of the prosecutor orjudge.' 7
8 See id. at 1134.
9 See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from
the National Center for State Courts Study of Hung juries, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1249, 1254
(2003).
10 See id. at 1253-54.
11 See Brown, supra note 2, at 1171-96; Hannaford-Agor & Hans, supra note 9, at
1254-55.
12 Hannaford-Agor & Hans, supra note 9, at 1254.
13 Id.
14 See id.
15 See id. at 1254-55.
16 See Brown, supra note 2, at 1191.
17 See Hannaford-Agor & Hans, supra note 9, at 1255.
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Unlike Brown who tries to locate certain categories of jury nullifi-
cation within "the rule of law," Thomas Regnier disavows the term
altogether.18 He explains that jury nullification is a pejorative term
that the founders never used.'9 According to Regnier, a jury weighs
law and fact to reach a 'just verdict."20 Thus, he explains, "[w]hat has
come to be called jury nullification' today is merely an occasional by-
product of a jury's right and duty to determine the law and the facts
complicately."21 Consequently, juries do not nullify but reach "ver-
dict[s] according to conscience." 22 On Regnier's view, when a jury
disregards a judge's instruction on the law, the jury's behavior is
dubbed "nullification" only because courts do not recognize the jury's
right to independently judge the law. Because judges view the law as
purely within their domain, ajury verdict contrary to a judge's instruc-
tion must mean that the jury has also made a judgment about the law
and has thereby usurped the judge's authority. For Regnier, the jury
has merely done its job by judging both law and fact to reach a just
verdict.2 3 The term "nullification" is therefore merely a judicial con-
struction to denigrate ajury verdict that represents an encroachment
on what judges believe is their exclusive province to determine ques-
tions of law.2 4
II
UTILITARIAN AND SAFETY-VALVE VIEWS OF JURY AuTHoRiTy
Juries iri late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America de-
cided both questions of law and questions of fact.25 The Supreme
Court ultimately withdrew the jury's authority to determine questions
of law in 1895, in Sparf v. United States.26 The Court's holding that the
jury has only the right to decide questions of fact, and not law, is
18 Thomas Regnier, Restoring the Founders' Ideal of the Independentjury in Criminal Cases,
51 SANTA CLAumA L. REv. 775, 778 (2011) ("I prefer instead to speak of jury discretion,'
jury independence,' or a jury's right to reach a 'verdict according to conscience."').
19 See id. at 776.
20 Id. at 777.
21 Id at 778.
22 Id.
23 See id. at 777.
24 See id. at 778.
25 See Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 Wis.
L. REv. 377, 377.
26 See 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895). The Court did not base its holding firmly within any
constitutional clause or amendment. In particular, the Court mentioned neither the Sixth
nor the Fourteenth Amendment. In this regard, its opinion is typical of many jury-nullifi-
cation opinions, which reiterate tried disapproval ofjury nullification without referencing
constitutional text. See, e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105-06 (11th Cir. 1983)
(citing only case law for its disapproval ofjury nullification); United States v. Washington,
705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d
1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1969) (same).
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widely understood as the "final and authoritative denial of the (jury's]
right" to decide questions of law, and concomitantly, its right to nul-
lify the law as instructed by the judge.27
To justify the modern scope of the jury's authority in both nullifi-
cation and non-nullification cases, courts mix two lines of reasoning-
consequentialist and deontological-that reflect, respectively, func-
tionalist and formalist jurisprudence.28 One can categorize these ac-
counts as utilitarian and "safety-valve" views of the jury's authority.
Both views help shape courts' antiauthoritarian and antimajoritarian
constructions of the jury.
A. A Utilitarian View of Jury Authority
In the years leading up to the American Revolution, the jury be-
came a center of politicized debate between the Crown and colo-
nists.29 Colonial Americans saw jury verdicts as "formal expressions of
public will," embodying the colonists' resistance to imperial rule.3 0
The jury's real, if not fully realized, power to nullify unjust imperial
law, check the caprice of biased judges, and bring authoritarian magis-
trates to justice gained ideological salience in pamphlets and even
mock criminal trials of magistrates, where individuals acted out the
roles of accused, judge, jury, prosecution, and defense.31
27 Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 582, 589
(1939).
28 See Robert F. Schopp, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and Necessity as fury Responses
to Crimes of Conscience, 69 S. Ca. L. REv. 2039, 2065 (1996).
29 See Daniel D. Blinka, Jefferson and Juries: The Problem of Law, Reason, and Politics in the
New Republic, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 35, 51, 55-56 (2005) (describing colonial juries' resis-
tance to what they perceived as Parliament's "varied attempts to impose increased hegem-
ony over North America").
30 Id. at 56. In the years leading up to the Revolutionary War, Parliament severely
restricted the jury trial in the colonies. Because the colonial juries could shield resisters
from punishment, Parliament expanded use of juryless admiralty courts and imposed the
"Coercive Acts" on Massachusetts, which allowed the royal governor to transport individu-
als accused of certain crimes to Middlesex for trial. See id. at 53, 57-58; see also THOMAS
JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITIsa AMERICA 15 (1774), available at
http://www.wdl.org/en/item/117/ (decrying the emptiness of a jury trial conducted
before individuals foreign to the community and the case, which effectively denied those
accused the "privilege of trial by peers" and subjected them to "judges predetermined to
condemn").
31 The rhetoric of "trial by jury" galvanized popular support against British rule. In a
mock "show trial" in 1774, for example, Virginians indicted Lord North for high treason
for imposing unconstitutional taxes. They arraigned him and impaneled "a special jury of
freeman" to hear North's defense. The jury deliberated and rendered a guilty verdict.
The actor in the role of North then confessed to his crimes, begged for forgiveness, and
warned other magistrates not to repeat his mistakes. Despite the pretend-North's contri-
tion, the jury hung and burned him in effigy. In 1765, Richard Henry Lee enlisted his
slaves to perform a show trial of Prime Minister George Grenvile and the local stamp col-
lector George Mercer in response to the Stamp Act. They too were found guilty, their
effigies hung and burned. See Blinka, supra note 29, at 56-57. The rhetoric of "trial by
jury" in colonial America is a good example of the contradictory character of the jury. In
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For the founders, the jury's ability to represent community senti-
ment was a central component of its authority.32 Nevertheless, the
jury's power to determine both law and fact evoked ambivalent senti-
ment among even one of its most ardent supporters. Although
Thomas Jefferson expressed deep admiration for the "twelve honest
men," he was also concerned with the potential caprice of juries.33
Jefferson feared that orators like Patrick Henry could twist jurors'
emotions and manipulate jurors with their "golden throat[s] to irra-
tional verdicts."34 Even still, Jefferson believed the jury had the right
to decide questions of fact and law and expressed a very utilitarian
argument for this right. For Jefferson, the jury's "common sense,"
even with its potential for irrationality, was a necessary threat to de-
mocracy, and a lesser one than biased judges.35 According to Jeffer-
son, although the jury had the power to determine both law and fact,
it often deferred to the expertise of the judge on questions of law and
only used its discretion to determine law in cases involving "liberty" or
a "biased judge[ ]."36 Explaining jurors' deference to the opinion of
judges on questions of law, Jefferson wrote:
[S]ensible that they were inadequate to difficult questions of law,
these [questions] were generally confided to permanent judges, but
reserving to juries the decision both of law and fact where in their
opinion bias in the permanent judge might be apprehended, and
where honest ignorance would be safer than perverted
science . . .3
Thus, Jefferson's belief in the jury's right to decide questions of
law and fact was the product of a utilitarian balancing of the virtues
Lord North's trial, the mock jury was itself "predetermined to condemn" and showed no
mercy despite North's contrition. SeeJEFFERSON, supra note 30, at 15. Notwithstanding the
importance of the "jury of freeman" to the trial by jury narrative, show trials conscripted
slaves to play the roles ofjurors. The entire trial was an act of contrived justice intended to
channel the views of the masses through political theater. For a discussion of how political
theater has "illuminate (d] the culture of democracy" since ancient Athens, see EmilianoJ.
Buis, How to Play justice and Drama in Antiquity: Law and Theater in Athens as Perfonative
Rituals, 16 F.A. J. INT'L L. 697, 721, 724 (2004).
32 See Blinka, supra note 29, at 71 ("Jury sentencing fully comported with the floodtide
of republican rhetoric, the experience of local committees and the revolutionary prece-
dent that required the use of juries in admiralty litigation.").
33 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE, STATE OF VIRGINIA 130 (William Peden ed.,
1972) (1787); Blinka, supra note 29, at 57 ("The common-law jury's raw power to deter-
mine facts and law insulated the people from oppression by the king, judges, and even
legislatures.").
34 See Blinka, supra note 29, at 48 (quoting MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND THE NEW NATION: A BIOGRAPHY 20-21 (1970)).
35 See id. at 98.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 101 (quoting 2 THE REPUBUC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826, at 1076 (James Morton Smith ed.,
1995)).
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and dangers of judges and jurors, reflecting a functionalist approach
to the jury's authority. Although Jefferson acknowledged that jurors
were sometimes ignorantly swayed by their emotions or external moti-
vations, he concluded that they were best able to make decisions for
the "general welfare," preferring the "honest ignorance" of jurors to
the "perverted science" of judges. 8 The jury's ability to represent
community sentiment and make decisions for the general welfare
made it an essentially democratic institution. The importance of the
jury trial to the notion of liberty in a democratic society is under-
scored by the severe restrictions Parliament placed on the jury right in
the colonies in response to colonial juries' refusal to enforce unpopu-
lar laws by acquitting violators39 and the subsequent charge against
King George II for restricting the jury trial in the Declaration of
Independence.40
B. A Safety-Valve View of Jury Authority
In denying the jury's right to nullify, modem judicial opinions
have capitalized on the idea that the jury is a "'safety valve' for excep-
tional cases."4 1 Under this view, if any balancing exists, it must stop at
a deontological minimum, where the jury is the last protector of the
individual against arbitrary authority.42 As discussed below, courts
and commentators have woven the notion of the jury as a safety valve
into an evolutionary story of the jury in American history; once the
American system of government grew stable roots, the jury was no
longer necessary as a regular check against biased judges and there-
fore its role could be relegated to its deontological minimum as a
safety valve of the criminal justice system.43
The safety-valve view of the jury comports with William Black-
stone's criticism of John Locke's social contract theory, an important
justification for the American Revolution.44 According to Locke,
38 Id. at 38, 55, 101; see also 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 222 (James DeWitt An-
drews ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896) [hereinafter WILSON] ("Juries undoubtedly may
make mistakes: they may commit errors: they may commit gross ones. But changed as they
constantly are, their errors and mistakes can never grow into a dangerous system.").
39 For example, Parliament instituted vice-admiralty courts in Boston, Philadelphia,
and Charleston to "elude[ ] the legal blockade posed by hostile colonial courts." Blinka,
supra note 29, at 57-58.
40 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
41 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see Rubenstein,
supra note 2, at 965.
42 See Schopp, supra note 28, at 2049 (explaining how, unlike consequentialistjustifi-
cations, deontological justifications for the jury's authority do not depend on empirical
assertions).
43 See infra Part IV.B.
44 See 2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFER-
ENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 161 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch
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"there remains still inherent in the people a supreme power to re-
move or alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary
to the trust reposed in them: for, when such trust is abused, it is
thereby forfeited, and devolves to those who gave it."65 Blackstone
suggested that regardless of the merits or necessity of Locke's theory,
giving the theory legal significance was paramount to anarchy.46 As
Blackstone explained, "however, just this conclusion may be, in the-
ory, we cannot practically adopt it, nor take any legal steps for carrying
it into execution, . . . for this devolution of power, to the people at
large, includes in it a dissolution of the whole form of govern-
ment .. . . "47 Here, Blackstone essentially expresses a safety-valve view.
Although "remov[ing] or alter[ing] the legislative" when it acts con-
trary to the power entrusted in it by the people may be necessary in
extreme circumstances, this act can never be given legal signifi-
cance.48 Similarly, opinions that adopt a safety-valve view of the jury
reason that although juries can nullify the law since their acquittals
are unreviewable, and in some rare circumstances nullification is cru-
cial to protect American democracy as a last resort, this power can
never be given the legal significance of a "right" because to do so
would invite anarchy and lawlessness. Thus, under the safety-valve
view, the jury's nullification power represents an absolute floor of pro-
tection against tyranny but is not a regular component of the jury's
democratic participation in the criminal justice system. 49
The safety-valve view is also consistent with the idea that the foun-
ders set in motion a gradual shift in power from jury to judge when
they established an independent judiciary in the Constitution. St.
George Tucker praised the new nation as "the first in which this abso-
lute independence of the judiciary has formed one of the fundamen-
tal principles of the government."50 Thus, Tucker explained that
unlike their royal counterparts, federal judges would be a "calm, tem-
perate, upright"5' shield protecting individuals from "the sword of
& Abraham Small 1803). In a footnote to this text, St. George Tucker wrote, "[t] his princi-
ple is expressly recognized in our government." Id. at 161 n.25.
45 Id. at 161 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 149 (C.B.




49 For those like Thomas Regnier who see the jury-nullification power as central to
the regular mode of jury participation, ajury verdict always requires the jury to determine
law and fact "complicately." See Regnier, supra note 18, at 777 (emphasis omitted). Justice
James Wilson expressed a similar view when he wrote, "in many cases, the question of law is
intimately and inseparably blended with the question of fact: and when this is the case, the
decision of one necessarily involves the decision of the other." WiLsON, supra note 38, at
219-20.
50 1 TUCKER, supra note 44, app. at 354.
51 Id. app. at 355.
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usurped authority, the darts of oppression, and the shafts of faction
and violence."5 2 While Tucker acknowledged the importance of the
jury as a check on judicial power, his treatment of the jury was rather
dismissive and conclusory.53 This treatment is consistent with an un-
derstanding of the jury as a safety valve. Although Tucker gave lip
service to the idea that the jury is an important constitutional safe-
guard, he focused on independent judges as the check against legisla-
tive and executive abuse.54 To this end, Tucker explicitly suggested
that the judiciary was the main constitutional protector of individual
rights.5 5 Thus, once the jury right was secured in the Constitution,
attention could turn to the development of the judicial branch, whose
judges Tucker believed would need to make significant strides toward
the constitutional ideal of an independent judiciary that could ade-
quately check legislative and executive abuse.56
III
THE DUAL CHARACTER OF THE JURY IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts not only hail the
jury as a bastion of liberty, they also deride it as a seed of anarchy.57
When courts address a defendant's right to trial by jury where the
issue of jury nullification is not before them, they are likely to ex-
pound on the antiauthoritarian virtues of the jury and the historical
importance of the jury as a check on biased judges and arbitrary pros-
ecutors. However, when courts address the issue of whether ajury has
a right to decide questions of law or nullify the law with an acquittal,
they are likely to emphasize the antimajoritarian character of the jury
by situating the jury in opposition to publicly elected legislatures and
describing the jury as a rogue minority instead of a representative of
the majority in its own right.58
52 Id. app. at 357.
53 In his treatment of the judiciary, for example, Tucker addresses the jury only three
times-first, where he acknowledges that the absence of a trial by jury provision in the
Constitution was one of the main objections to it; second, where he recites the text of the
Sixth Amendment; and third, in the final sentence of the section, where he notes that the
provision in the Seventh Amendment that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of common
law ... removed one of the most powerful objections made to [the judiciary] department."
Id. app. at 351, 358, 361.
54 See id. app. at 355.
55 See id. app. at 357.
56 For example, Tucker lamented the conduct of two Chief Justices who served as
foreign envoys while holding office on the Supreme Court. See id. app. at 356 (explaining
how executive appointments threaten the impartiality ofjudges because they "have a natu-
ral tendency to excite hopes, and secure compliance").
57 See supra note 5.
58 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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A. The Jury as Antiauthoritarian
When courts address the jury right where the issue of nullifica-
tion is not directly before them, they often expound on the an-
tiauthoritarian virtues of the jury. These opinions go beyond mere
description of the importance of the jury to the nation's founders.
They are works of hyperbole that not only wax eloquent on the histori-
cal importance of the jury but also expound on the jury's institutional
role as a safeguard against judicial overreaching. As an an-
tiauthoritarian institution, the jury protects defendants against tyr-
anny by interposing the conscience of the community between the
defendant and government, and protecting the defendant against a
biased judge or arbitrary prosecutor. In incorporating the right to
trial by jury in Duncan v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court explained,
"l[t]hose who wrote our [federal and state] constitutions knew from
history and experience that it was necessary to protect against un-
founded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against
judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority."5 9 The Court
stressed the importance of the jury as a check on judicial
overreaching:
The framers of the [federal and state] constitutions strove to create
an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection
against arbitrary action.... Fear of unchecked power, so typical of
our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found expres-
sion in the criminal law in this insistence upon community partici-
pation in the determination of guilt or innocence.60
More recently, in Blakely v. Washington, the Court, through justice
Antonin Scalia, explained, "the very reason the Framers put ajury-trial
guarantee in the Constitution is that they were unwilling to trust gov-
ernment to mark out the role of the jury."61 The rub in Blakely is that
the Court reaffirmed only the jury's role as fact finder.62 Washington
state's mandatory sentencing guidelines allowed ajudge to increase a
defendant's sentence above the statutory maximum if the judge found
the defendant acted with "deliberate cruelty."63 The Court found this
provision unconstitutional because it deprived the defendant of the
right to trial byjury. The Court grounded its holding in the jury trial
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment and explained that the jury right
includes the right to have the jury determine aggravating factors in
59 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
60 Id.
61 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004).
62 See id. at 308-09; see albo Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 168 (2009) ("[O]ur opinions
make clear that the Sixth Amendment does not countenance legislative encroachment on
the jury's traditional domain.").
63 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300 (quoting WASH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.390(2)(h) (iii) (2010)).
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sentencing.64 By independently finding an aggravating factor, the
judge had taken the fact-finding authority away from the jury and
therefore denied the defendant the right to a jury trial. The Court's
concern about judicial overreaching in Blakely reflects the idea that
the right to determine facts, if taken from the jury, would eviscerate
the jury right altogether. Thus, the question before the Court did not
require the Justices to balance the competencies of judge and jury in
order to decide whom among them is best able to answer a factual
question regarding the existence of an aggravating factor. Rather, the
question required the Court to decide the minimum authority the
jury must have to function as ajury under the Sixth Amendment. The
Court concluded that this absolute minimum is the right to determine
"all facts legally essential to the punishment."65
Dissenting in a case where the Court applied the harmless error
rule to a judge's failure to submit the issue of materiality of certain
falsehoods to the jury, Justice Scalia gave this powerful exhortation of
the importance of the jury as a check on judicial power:
Perhaps the Court is so enamoured of judges in general, and fed-
eral judges in particular, that it forgets that they (we) are officers of
the Government, and hence proper objects of that healthy suspi-
cion of the power of government which possessed the Framers and
is embodied in the Constitution. Who knows?-20 years of appoint-
ments of federal judges by oppressive administrations might pro-
duce judges willing to enforce oppressive criminal laws, and to
interpret criminal laws oppressively-at least in the view of the citi-
zens in some vicinages where criminal prosecutions must be
brought. And so the people reserved the function of determining
criminal guilt to themselves, sitting as jurors. It is not within the
power of us Justices to cancel that reservation . . . .66
Here, Justice Scalia emphasizes an important point about the
structural role and continuing relevance of the jury as a check against
biasedjudges. While Tucker saw the independentjudiciary as the cor-
nerstone of the Constitution's protection of individual rights, 67 Justice
Scalia suggests that the judiciary is not as independent as Tucker envi-
sioned and is always in danger of becoming an arm of the executive
instead of a check against it. Scholars like Matthew Harrington argue
that the professionalization of the bench and trust in the indepen-
dence and integrity of federal judges that did not exist at the nation's
64 Many courts, however, do not cite constitutional text for their holdings on nullifica-
tion issues. See supra note 26.
65 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)).
66 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 32 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
67 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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founding justify diminutions of the jury's law-finding authority.68 Jus-
tice Scalia points out, however, that the constitutional vision of an in-
dependent judiciary cannot be achieved to a point where the jury is
no longer needed to protect individuals from the bias of judges or
prosecutors. The institutions the founders created to check the power
of the actors in the criminal justice system must continue irrespective
of the integrity of governmental actors at any period of time because
that integrity can easily shift toward authoritarianism with 'judges too
responsive to the voice of higher authority."69 The jury must always
have the authority to check such authoritarianism precisely because
one cannot trust the biased judge or arbitrary prosecutor to reinstate
such authority when it is needed most.7 0
While Justice Scalia's language in this case is evocative of the an-
tiauthoritarian character of the jury, Justice Scalia takes issue with the
fact that the jury had not determined every element of guilt-that is,
the jury had not made a factual determination of every element of
guilt-which he thinks the Court should have treated as a structural
error rather than a harmless one.7 ' As in Blakely, Justice Scalia empha-
sizes the jury's authority as representative of the people, conscience of
the community, and protector of defendants against judges, who are
themselves instruments of government. Taken out of context, Justice
Scalia's language suggests that the jury is the essential an-
tiauthoritarian protector of liberty-the "spinal column of American
democracy."72 However, he makes these statements securely within
the context of the jury's role as fact finder. Justice Scalia is therefore
free to expound on his concerns about the encroachment of
unelected Article III judges on the province of the representative jury
where the scope of the jury's authority is limited to fact finding and
the judge's expertise in matters of law is not in question.73
68 See Harrington, supra note 25, at 380, 405.
69 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
70 For Justice Wilson, one of the jury's great virtues was its size and fluidity. Because
the jury verdict was the decision of twelve men, not one, the jury was antidictatorial. At the
same time, because the jury was constantly refreshed with a different set of twelve men, the
mistakes or caprice of a particular jury could not threaten democracy as the mistakes or
caprice of any one judge or legislature could. WILsoN, supra note 38, at 222.
71 See Neder 527 U.S. at 30, 33.
72 Id. at 30.
73 See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513,
1525-26 (1991) (describing how formalists, like Justice Antonin Scalia, often support ma-
joritarianism and adhere to a doctrine of judicial restraint). Justice Scalia's formalism,
however, does not imply that he would support giving the jury a right to decide questions
of law as well as fact. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CI. L. REv.
1175, 1181 (1989) (discussing the line between the judge's province over questions of law
and the jury's province over questions of fact).
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B. The Jury as Antimajoritarian
When courts directly address the issue of jury nullification, they
often describe the jury as an antimajoritarian institution, a rogue mi-
nority of individuals who have usurped the power of the legislature by
nullifying laws enacted by an elected, representative body.74 Denying
a right to nullification instructions in United States v. Moylan, the
Fourth Circuit explained, "[n]o legal system could long survive if it
gave every individual the option of disregarding with impunity any law
which by his personal standard was judged morally untenable."75 The
court went on to emphasize that "[t]oleration of such conduct would
not be democratic . . . but inevitably anarchic."76 Judge Leventhal
echoed this image of the jury for the D.C. Circuit in United States v.
Dougherty: "As the distrust of judges appointed and removable by the
king receded, there came increasing acceptance that . .. the protec-
tion of citizens lay not in recognizing the right of each jury to make its
own law, but in following democratic processes for changing the
law."7 7 Both of these opinions paint the jury as a group of individuals
that substitutes personal standards for the judgment of the legislature
instead of a group that acts as a representative body in its own right.7 8
These individualistic images of the jury are a far cry from the image of
the jury as an instrument of "community participation in the determi-
nation of guilt or innocence" that the Duncan Court described.79
There is no place in Judge Leventhal's jury for jury nullification as a
form of democratic participation. Both the Fourth Circuit and the
D.C. Circuit place jury nullification outside of and in contradiction to
democratic processes by positioning thejury in opposition to the legis-
lature, leaving no room for any commonality of functions.
Some of the most ardent antimajoritarian language comes from
the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Washington.80 Affirming a district
court's refusal to give a nullification instruction to the jury, the court
explained that such an instruction would "encourage the substitution
of individual standards for openly developed community rules."81 By
"openly developed community rules," the court was referring to laws
74 See Hannaford-Agor & Hans, supra note 9, at 1250 (describing jury nullification as
"a counter-majoritarian measure" in which "a small minority of citi-
zens . . . invalidate . .. laws that have been established through the legislative process").
75 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969).
76 Id.
77 473 F.2d 1113, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
78 Alexis de Tocqueville, by contrast, analogized the jury to universal suffrage as a
"means of making the majority prevail." 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
273 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., 1969) (1835).
79 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).




passed by Congress. 2 It emphasized this point when it charged that
jury nullification verdicts "are lawless, a denial of due process and con-
stitute an exercise of erroneously seized power."83 Although then-
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined the per curiam Washington opin-
ion, her biting reproach ofjury nullification does not carry over to her
sentiment about the jury in non-nullification opinions-Justice Gins-
burg, for example, joined Justice Scalia's Blakely opinion.84 This di-
chotomy is consistent with the dual approach courts often take to
classifying the jury. Washington reflects the tendency of judges to de-
fine jury nullification in a way that is incompatible with the rule of law.
In the short two paragraphs the court devoted to the nullification is-
sue, it did not mention any function of the jury as an antiauthoritarian
institution. Instead, it repeatedly highlighted the individual dissi-
dence of jurors to the rule of law.85
IV
TENSION BETWEEN ANTIAUTHORITARIAN AND ANTIMAJORITARIAN
CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE JURY
One way to understand the judicial rhetoric on the jury is to ana-
lyze judicial attempts to construct the identity of the jury in American
democracy and obstacles judges face in doing so. The tension be-
tween antimajoritarian depictions of the jury in nullification opinions
and antiauthoritarian depictions of the jury in non-nullification opin-
ions is heightened in an opinion like United States v. Dougherty, where
the court attempted to justify the limited role of the jury as fact finder
from a historical perspective.86 Judge Leventhal's Dougherty opinion
holds a particularly important place in American jurisprudence on
jury nullification, as it is "the first modern case to discuss the jury nul-
lification instruction at length and debate the wisdom of instructing
the jurors about their power to nullify."87 Consequently, "[n]o exami-
nation ofjury nullification is complete without looking at [it]."88 The
question before the Dougherty court was whether the trial judge erred
in refusing to inform the jury of its right to nullify the law or allow the
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 She also joined the opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000),
where the Court held that the jury must find any fact that increases a defendant's sentence
above the statutory maximum, other than a prior criminal conviction.
85 See Washington, 705 F.2d at 494.
86 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
87 Aaron T. Oliver, Jury Nullification: Should the Type of Case Matter?, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 49, 53 (1997) (quoting Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours
of a Controversy, 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 51, 65 (1980)).
88 Id.; see Brody, supra note 2, at 92 & n.42 (citing cases and arguing that "[t]he cir-
cuits and states that have considered the issue have thus far followed the Dougherty
majority").
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defendant to do so.89 Judge Leventhal devotes nearly eight pages in
the Federal Reporter to the historical evolution and modern scope of the
jury's authority.90 His opinion demonstrates how any attempt at
thoughtful examination of the history of the jury in America must in-
corporate the antiauthoritarian strand of the jury's history into a story
that concludes with the modern jury as necessarily limited to deciding
questions of fact. Judge Leventhal must also mitigate the historical
role of the judiciary in limiting the jury's authority to fact finding. He
approaches both of these challenges by highlighting the jury's an-
timajoritarian character as a great danger to liberty and democracy.
Specifically, he takes three steps to highlight the jury's an-
timajoritarian character and minimize its antiauthoritarian character:
(1) he balances the relative competencies of the judge and jury in a
utilitarian calculation that reflects a vision of judges as apolitical and
objective deciders of the rule of law; (2) he describes how the jury's
authority to decide both law and fact was limited to the nascent, strug-
gling democracy and is no longer necessary in a more stable democ-
racy; and (3) he relies on legislative authorization for the limitation of
the jury's authority.91
A. The Judge as Objective, Privileged Decider of Law
The conceptual understanding of the federal judge as an apoliti-
cal and objective decider of the rule of law supports Judge Leventhal's
rhetorical argument for a power shift from the jury to the judge re-
garding questions of law.92 To this extent, Judge Leventhal engages in
the same utilitarian balancing that Jefferson used to reach the oppo-
site result.93 While Judge Leventhal acknowledges the historical im-
portance of the jury as a check on the power of biased judges, he
emphasizes how its role has become less important as America's de-
mocracy has prospered and its judiciary has developed into a vener-
able institution within America's three-branch system of
government.94 Explaining the shift in the utilitarian balance, Judge
Leventhal writes:
The youthful passion for independence accommodated itself to the
reality that the former rebels were now in control of their own
destiny, that the practical needs of stability and sound growth out-
weighed the abstraction of centrifugal philosophy, and that the
judges in the courts, were not the colonial appointees projecting
royalist patronage and influence but were themselves part and par-
89 See Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1117.
90 See id. at 1130-37.
91 See id.
92 See id. at 1132.
93 See supra Part II.A.
94 See Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1132.
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cel of the nation's intellectual mainstream, subject to the checks of
the common law tradition and professional opinion, and capable, in
Roscoe Pound's words, of providing "true judicial justice" standing
in contrast with the colonial experience.95
Thus, once federal judges became what royal judges could never
fully be according to the founders-"apolitical, scientific, and objec-
tive" 96-the jury's authority to determine law was no longer defensi-
ble, especially in light of the judge's expertise in that domain. In
contrast to judges, the jury is more prone to apply personal standards
of morality and less competent to decide questions of law.9 7 Thus, by
characterizing judges as nonbiased, Judge Leventhal justifies the shift
in authority to decide questions of law from the jury to the judge as
making logical and evolutionary sense because the Jeffersonian bal-
ance that justified the original allocation of authority has shifted.98 As
Judge Leventhal explains, "[a]n equilibrium has evolved-an often
marvelous balance-with the jury acting as a 'safety valve' for excep-
tional cases, without being a wildcat or runaway institution."99
Through this utilitarian calculus, Judge Leventhal demonstrates how
the jury became merely a safety valve of democracy. 00
Tucker's commentary on the independent judiciary seems to
foreshadow this limitation on the jury's authority; the founders estab-
lished an independent judiciary to isolate judges from the types of
influence that could bias their opinions. 01 Likewise, for Judge
Leventhal, once judges' superior qualifications were backed by a
larger structure that reduced the danger of bias, the limitation of the
jury's authority to fact finding was inevitable.' 0 2 If part of the central
endorsement for the broad role of the jury as decider of fact grew out
of this utilitarian sense that the jury's potential capriciousness was the
lesser evil to the judge's potential bias, then a description of a more
insulated and reasoned judiciary helps Judge Leventhal justify the re-
duction in the jury's power that occurred throughout the nineteenth
century.
B. A Whiggish View of Jury Nullification
The notion that achievement of great liberty in a society can jus-
tify the abolition of liberty's safeguards belies the reason for the safe-
guard in the first place and is a key tension in Judge Leventhal's
95 Id. (quoting 4 RoscOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 8-9 (1959)).
96 Blinka, supra note 29, at 38.
97 See Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1134.
98 Id. at 1132.
99 Id. at 1134.
100 Id.
101 1 TUCKER, supra note 44, app. at 355.
102 See Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1132, 1134.
728 [Vol. 98:711
THE DUAL FACE OF THE AMERICAN JURY
opinion. Judge Leventhal incorporates utilitarian balancing into an
evolutionary description of American democracy toward a pinnacle of
liberty where society no longer needs the jury to protect individuals
against tyranny.103 This logic is reflected in scholarly work on the
jury's law-finding function. For example, Matthew Harrington justi-
fies the shift in power as a result of an "increasing professionalization
of the bench" and an expansion of the jury's ranks-once "jury service
was opened to a wider segment of the population, juries could no
longer be counted on to speak from a common set of beliefs and ex-
periences."1 0 4 After explaining how "the decline of the jury's power
over law" was "entirely a judge-led exercise,"1 05 Harrington concludes
that "[i]t was only natural, therefore, that the jury's earlier law-making
function became a casualty to the march of time."1 0 6 Harrington's
description comports with a view that popular control over the law is
central to a nation founded on the principle of popular sovereignty
but that "naturally" this conferral of power to the people in the form
of the jury is short lived and gives way to a more formalized law-mak-
ing process.1 0 7
Judge Leventhal and Harrington interweave utilitarian balancing
with an evolutionary perspective of the jury. These accounts reflect
the type of Whiggish view of history for which scholars like Sir Henry
Maine have been criticized.10 Specifically, Harrington attributes the
decline in the jury's power to a weakening of the jury's status as mem-
bers from lower social classes entered its ranks and as American soci-
ety became less community based and more individualistic. 0 9 Thus,
the decrease in jurors' community ties and competency justified the
jury's decline in power, as jurors' limited expertise in the law became
ever more contrasted with that of the judge. A big weakness of this
argument is that it assumes there is a point in a nation's development
where the threat of tyranny and authoritarianism becomes so low that
the nation should discard or winnow down former protections. In re-
103 See id. at 1132 ("As the distrust of judges appointed and removable by the king
receded, there came increasing acceptance that ... the protection of citizens lay not in
recognizing the right of each jury to make its own law, but in following democratic
processes for changing the law."); supra Part IV.A.
104 Harrington, supra note 25, at 380.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 440.
107 See Hannaford-Agor & Hans, supra note 9, at 1257-58 (explaining how growing
faith in government and political efficacy and the idea that government officials who make
the law are "accountable to the citizenry" creates less need for "citizens to nullify the law in
their capacity as trial jurors").
108 See Morton J. Horwitz, Mark Tushnet, Legal Historian, 90 GEO. L.J. 131, 135 (2001).
109 See Harrington, supra note 25, at 435 ("The increasingly pluralist nature of the new
American Republic made it less likely that the jury would apply 'standards shaped by a
template of common beliefs."' (quoting BRUcE H. MANN, NEIGHBOts & STRANGERS: LAW
AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT 71 (1987))).
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sponse to the argument that jury independence is no longer as neces-
sary in modern society where public officials are answerable to a
democratic citizenry, Thomas Regnier explains:
[T]he founders didn't see it that way. Even as they were creating a
government in which the people had a greater voice than ever
before, they insisted on the trial by jury. . .. The founders were
acutely aware of the tendency of those in power to crave more
power, and they knew that even popularly elected institutions could
become corrupt. Democratically chosen judges may become be-
holden to their campaign contributors, and appointed judges may
feel an obligation to those who appointed them.110
Regnier's argument has striking similarities to Justice Scalia's
Neder v. United States dissent.11 ' Justice Scalia admonished against judi-
cial overreaching because he recognized the continuing importance
of the jury as a check on arbitrary power.112 But Justice Scalia con-
fined his argument to the status quo of the jury as fact finder. He did
not engage in utilitarian balancing but instead took the boundaries of
the jury's authority with regard to fact finding as given. Both the Neder
majority and dissent viewed the jury's right to decide questions of fact
as unquestionable and thus beyond utilitarian balancing.113 Judge
Leventhal and Harrington's evolutionary and utilitarian story of the
jury thus only applies in the context of nullification.
C. The Judge-Led Movement to Restrict the Jury Power as Fox
Guarding the Henhouse
Regardless of whether Judge Leventhal is right about the compe-
tencies of federal judges, he must contend with the question of
whether judges ever had the power to unilaterally remove the jury's
authority to decide questions of law. Judge Leventhal does not raise
the concern of judicial overreaching that Justice Scalia and the
Duncan majority expressed, but his opinion makes clear that it lingers
backstage. Ajudicially orchestrated change in the scope of the jury's
power presents the constitutionally troubling scenario that Justice
Scalia recognized when he emphasized the implausibility that the
framers would have "left definition of the scope of jury power" to the
judiciary where the jury was meant to check judicial bias.114 Judge
Leventhal's effort to ground the antinullification holding in a histori-
110 SeeRegnier, supra note 18, at 826, 833 (footnote omitted) ("It is not difficult to find
instances of law enforcers making false arrests, prosecutors pursuing unjust prosecutions,
and legislatures making unwise or unjust laws." (footnotes omitted)).
111 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112 See supra Part III.A.
113 See 527 U.S. at 18 (majority opinion); id. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
114 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004).
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cal analysis of the jury reflects his uneasiness with the role of the judi-
ciary in redefining the scope of the jury's authority.115 Because Judge
Leventhal acknowledges the historical authority of juries to decide
both questions of law and fact, he has to explain how that right be-
came merely a power. His utilitarian balancing provides one method
of justification. However, he still has to answer the question of how a
right to decide law became a power without implicating the judiciary
in a fox guarding the henhouse scenario. Judge Leventhal thus goes
back over a hundred years to the senate floor debates over the scope
of the jury's authority injustice Samuel Chase's impeachment trial."16
Judge Leventhal's reference to this trial is the only legislative source in
his historical analysis of the jury's authority. ThatJudge Leventhal felt
a need to include Justice Chase's impeachment trial suggests that he
was uncomfortable explaining the scope of the jury power as a purely
judicial imposition. Utilitarian balancing only explains why the jury
should not decide questions of law but not who should draw the line
around the jury's authority. Judge Leventhal's utilitarian justification
thus leaves open an important separation-of-powers question that he
tries to cover by seeking legislative sanction, but his attempt to justify
the power shift highlights the insufficiency of the utilitarian argument
standing alone.
V
COMMENTATOR AND DISTRICT COURT RELIANCE ON
NoN-NULLIFICATION OPINIONS
The dual character of the jury as antiauthoritarian and an-
timajoritarian shapes and underlies modem debate on jury nullifica-
tion. Arie Rubenstein, for example, emphasizes the Supreme Court's
decision incorporating the jury right in Duncan v. Louisiana as a shift
away from formalism toward recognition of the importance of the jury
in the American legal system.117 He explains that "jury nullification is
consistent with the Supreme Court's jury trial jurisprudence" and that
this shift in jurisprudence should lead to a more favorable reception
of jury nullification by the Supreme Court." 8 Rubenstein scolds the
federal courts for continuing to apply a formalistic approach to jury
nullification based on the Supreme Court's Sparf v. United States deci-
sion instead of following the Supreme Court's more pragmatic juris-
prudence marked by Duncan v. Louisiana."19 Rubenstein argues that
115 See Harrington, supra note 25, at 380.
116 See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1132 & n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
117 See Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 976.
118 Id. at 984.
119 See id. at 961, 975 (arguing that "lower courts continue to rely on nineteenth-cen-




the jury should have more decision-making authority to serve the ends
of "preventing oppression and promoting democracy" that Duncan
and Blakely espouse.120 However, this Note demonstrates that the an-
tiauthoritarian language in Duncan and Blakely is misleading because
Duncan and Blakely are non-nullification cases. Arguments like Ruben-
stein's misconceive Supreme Court and circuit courtjurisprudence on
the jury because they only focus on non-nullification opinions that
espouse very favorable, antiauthoritarian images of the jury that are
more consistent with a functionalist approach to the jury than the an-
timajoritarian formalism that has consistently characterized jurispru-
dence on the jury in jury nullification cases.
So long as the jury's authority is limited to fact finding, courts will
expound on the important functions of the jury. The problem is that
these non-nullification opinions do not engage in the utilitarian
calculus that would justify a broader role for the jury in the criminal
justice system. They assume the scope of jury authority is limited to
fact finding. Thus, the antiauthoritarian language in isolation might
suggest that the "marvelous balance" in Doughety was incorrect: the
jury has important functions beyond fact finding, is more competent
than Judge Leventhal described, and consequently should have au-
thority to decide questions of law in certain circumstances.12 1 But,
Judge Leventhal used utilitarian balancing to justify the removal of all
law-finding functions of the jury, which sweeps much more broadly
than the specific question of the right to nullification instructions that
the court was asked to address. Judge Leventhal's utilitarian reason-
ing was more a justification for the conclusion he wanted to reach
about the scope of the jury's authority in all situations than an en-
dorsement of a balancing approach to the division of power between
judge and jury.122 Lower courts' unsuccessful attempts to increase the
scope of the jury's authority through utilitarian arguments underscore
this point.
In United States v. Polizzi, Judge Jack B. Weinstein held that the
district court committed constitutional error by refusing a defendant's
request to instruct the jury on the mandatory minimum sentence of
five years for the crime of possessing child pornography.123 Judge
Weinstein concluded that the defendant had a Sixth Amendment
120 Id. at 982 (explaining that the scope of the jury's authority should be much more
expansive "[i]f what matters is 'the function that the particular feature performs and its
relation to the purposes of the jury trial'" (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 99-100
(1970))).
121 Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1134.
122 See infra Part VI (discussing Judge Harold Leventhal's strategic use of utilitarian
reasoning).
123 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated on other grounds sub nom., United
States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009).
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right to this instruction.' 2 4 The jury cannot exercise its power of leni-
ency appropriately, he explained, if it is not aware of the sentence that
must follow from a guilty verdict. He offered a different utilitarian
balance that would allow for such instructions:
[Clourts following Sparf appear to reflect a pervasive fear that our
heterogeneous jurors, unbound by common principles of morality,
education and dedication to the law, may deviate too far from judi-
cial views of the rule of law unless juries are tightly controlled. This
lack of faith in the good sense of juries is not generally shared by
trial judges who deal with them on a daily basis. 125
Furthermore, Judge Weinstein quoted Justice Scalia's language
on judicial overreaching in Neder to support the argument that the
jury should retain the right to impose leniency but cannot do so if it
does not know the sentences involved.' 2 6 Here, Judge Weinstein en-
gaged in selective opinion writing since he did not mention that Jus-
tice Scalia was referring to a concern of judicial overreaching with
regard to the jury's well-recognized fact-finding authority. The Sec-
ond Circuit vacated Judge Weinstein's opinion, explaining that its pre-
cedent, namely United States v. Thomas, rejects any judicial
encouragement of jury nullification.12 7 The Supreme Court has ex-
pressed a similar view regarding instructing the jury about the sen-
tencing consequences of its verdict, explaining that "providing jurors
sentencing information invites them to ponder matters that are not
within their province, distracts them from their fact-finding responsi-
bilities, and creates a strong possibility of confusion." 28
Judge Weinstein, however, is not alone in his belief that Supreme
Court decisions have paved a path for a more functionalist approach
to the jury that should permit, and even require, judicial instructions
on mandatory sentences. Lance Cassak and Milton Heumann de-
scribe the Blakely decision as part of a "revolution in sentencing in
which the Supreme Court has found in the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial the requirement that . . . juries find the facts that deter-
mine the punishment."I 2 9 Like Regnier,130 Cassak and Heumann ar-
gue that informing the jury of mandatory minimum sentences for
crimes at the guilt phase of trial would not encourage jury nullifica-
tion but help the jury fulfill its constitutionally mandated role:
If ... one accepts that, as a general proposition, jurors have a role
in sentencing decisions . . . and further that this derives from the
124 See id. at 404-05.
125 Id. at 421.
126 See id. at 428.
127 See Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 161.
128 Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994).
129 Cassak & Heumann, supra note 2, at 438.
130 See Regnier, supra note 18, at 779-80.
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constitutional right to trial by jury, then advising jurors about pun-
ishment and allowing them to act on that information is not a mat-
ter of jury nullification, but simply one manner in which the jury
carries out its assigned and constitutionally protected duty.' 31
Thus, Cassak and Heumann emphasize that the underlying logic
of recent Supreme Court decisions requires serious reconsideration of
the severe general rule that jurors should not be instructed of "the
punishment to be meted out in the cases in which they sit because
their role is limited to finding facts." 32 Nevertheless, they are not as
optimistic as Rubenstein or Judge Weinstein about the necessary im-
pact of recent Supreme Court decisions on the scope of the jury's
authority, expressing some skepticism about the sincerity of the
Court's opining on the functions of the jury in American democracy
while still acknowledging the logical import of these opinions.133
VI
FUNCTIONALiST BAIANcING VERSUS A FORMALIsT
BRIGHT-LINE RULE
The Supreme Court's Sparf v. United States opinion is widely un-
derstood as inking the sharp line that divides the judge and jury's au-
thority into the two distinct categories of law and fact.' 34 Circuit
courts have followed suit, holding that a jury does not have the right
to nullification instructions because it only has the power to nullify
the law by virtue of the fact that acquittals are not reviewable or pun-
ishable.135 Nullification instructions are consistent with a right to ac-
quit a defendant who is guilty under the law because certain rights
implicate the court's duty to protect those rights.' 36 Power to act,
however, does not implicate any duties but instead is merely the by-
product of other protections, such as jurors' protection from punish-
ment for their verdicts.' 37
131 Cassak & Heumann, supra note 2, at 494.
132 Id. at 412 n.6, 496.
133 See id. at 496 (explaining that "ours is also a system that believes-or at least pays lip
service to the idea-that juries play a central role in safeguarding our basic liberties" and
that "the Supreme Court has embarked on a 'revolutionary' reconsideration of the role of
the jury in sentencing").
134 See Howe, supra note 27, at 588-89.
135 E.g., United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Ajury has
no more 'right to find a 'guilty' defendant 'not guilty' than it has to find a 'not guilty'
defendant 'guilty,' and the fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while the
latter can be, does not create a right out of the power to misapply the law.").
136 See Schopp, supra note 28, at 2062 (explaining that standard jury instructions,
which inform jurors that they must apply the law as instructed by the judge, would burden
a right to nullify by making it less likely that jurors will exercise that right).
137 This protection dates to Bushell's Case, where Chief Justice Sir John Vaughan held
thatjurors could not be punished for their verdicts. (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.). In
Bushell's Case, the Court granted a writ of habeas corpus to Edward Bushell, who had been
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Instead of asking how the right is prescribed, judges deny the
right altogether, as if any recognition of the right presumes the logical
extremity of absolute disregard and disrespect for the rule of law. In
United States v. Thomas, for example, the Second Circuit explained,
"the power of juries to 'nullify' or exercise a power of lenity is just
that-a power; it is by no means a right or something that a judge
should encourage or permit if it is within his authority to prevent."138
Judge Leventhal echoed the same sentiment in Dougherty. 39 However,
as explained in Part IV, Judge Leventhal threw in a logical wrench by
discussing the jury's authority in terms of consequentialist reasoning
only to conclude that the jury's limited fact-finding authority is be-
yond such reasoning. This illogic is demonstrated in an analogy
Judge Leventhal drew between jury nullification instructions and
speed limit signs. He compared the difference between traditional
jury instructions and jury nullification instructions to the difference
between a speed limit sign that reads "60 m.p.h." and a speed limit
sign that reads "[d]rive as fast as you think appropriate, without the
posted limit as an anchor."140 The result: anarchy. Judges typically
remind the jury of its duty to follow the law provided to it in their jury
instructions.141 Despite these reminders, instances of jury nullifica-
tion still occur from time to time.142 Likewise, a sign limiting speeds
to "60 m.p.h. produces factual speeds 10 or even 15 miles greater."143
However, jury nullification instructions would produce a complete un-
raveling of the system just as a sign that says "[d] rive as fast as you
think appropriate" would be a huge safety hazard and a risk many
policymakers would deem not worth taking. For Judge Leventhal,
there is no in-between when it comes tojury nullification. There is a
60 miles per hour speed limit or no speed limit at all, or worse a sign
declaring to the world that there is no speed limit at all.
Judge Leventhal's analogy illustrates the important distinction be-
tween a right and a power in the jury nullification debate. If Judge
Leventhal thought the jury should be able to determine questions of
fined and arrested for voting to acquit William Penn and his codefendant against the
weight of the evidence. Id.; see also United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 615 (2d Cir.
1997) (stating that since Bushell's Case, "nullifying jurors have been protected from being
called to account for their verdicts"); Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 963 (explaining that for
two centuries after Bushell's Case, "thle] ruling empowered jurors to nullify when de-
manded by conscience").
138 116 F.3d at 615.
139 473 F.2d 1113, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
140 Id.
141 See id. at 1132 (explaining how the judge instructs jurors that they "are required to
follow the instructions of the court on all matters of law" as part of common "legal practice
and precedent").
142 Id. at 1136-37.
143 Id. at 1134.
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law in certain situations based on the utilitarian balance of competen-
cies between judges and jurors, he would not analogize jury nullifica-
tion instructions to a sign declaring no speed limit at all. He would
instead ask: what speed limit sign would promote the best outcome on
this road? Why then does he take so much care in couching his analy-
sis in utilitarian verbiage when he believes that the division of duties
between judge and jury is beyond such balancing?
Any semblance of utilitarian balancing in the Dougherty opinion
had the specific purpose of justifying the shift in power from jury to
judge over questions of law, not of representing a consequentialist ap-
proach to determining the scope of the jury's authority that may differ
with the circumstances of the legal question presented. There is
somewhat of an illogic to the use of consequentialist balancing to
reach a conclusion that is beyond such balancing, but that is exactly
what Judge Leventhal does. Despite the appearance that Judge
Leventhal's holding in Dougherty is based on a utilitarian calculus, it in
fact represents a deontological assumption that the jury's authority is
limited to fact finding and that the scope of its authority is beyond
such utilitarian balancing. The jury merely has the power to nullify
the law, but not the right to do so.'** To this extent, his opinion is
consistent with the formalistic jurisprudence that the Supreme Court
and circuit courts have followed with respect to jury nullification.
As mentioned in Part IV, Judge Leventhal's utilitarian balancing
in Dougherty is merely a rhetorical device to address the problematic
judicially-led movement to restrict the jury's authority to fact finding.
Although Judge Leventhal engages in utilitarian balancing, he does so
only as a persuasive writing device to justify the jury's power, and not
its right, to nullify law. This rhetorical device, though merely cursory,
is particularly powerful. It allows Judge Leventhal to tie up any re-
maining fragments of the jury's right to decide questions of law
through a historical evolution of the jury that culminates in the mod-
ern "marvelous balance" of authority between judge and jury. The
appearance of utilitarian balancing justifies the modern conception of
the jury as a safety valve that is easily amenable to an argument for
protecting and maintaining the current division of power.145
Unlike Judge Leventhal's ultimate safety-valve argument against
jury nullification instructions, arguments for jury instructions on
mandatory minimum sentences like Judge Weinstein's are consequen-
144 Id. at 1132.
145 See United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446, 449-50 (7th Cir. 1983) (adopting
Judge Leventhal's discussion of the "historical origins and evolution of the community
conscience or nullification verdict in Anglo-American jurisprudence" and admonishing
that the defendant's request for a nullification instruction "would have [the court] upset a
carefully and painstakingly developed jurisprudential balance in this delicate and poten-
tially explosive area" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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tialist.14 6 Judge Weinsten talks about the high competence of the ju-
rors with whom he deals every day and charges circuit judges and
Supreme CourtJustices as aloof and incorrect in their arguments that
jury nullification risks anarchy.147 To Judge Weinstein, these judges
are so far removed from the trial court that they misconceive the com-
petence and integrity of jurors.148 This argument seems to be a
proper counter to opinions like Dougherty that appear to use utilitarian
balancing tojustify the limits on the jury's authority. However, to the
extent that courts only recognize the jury's power to nullify and the
utilitarian balancing is simply a tool to minimize the antiauthoritarian
character of the jury, arguments like Judge Weinstein's will fall on un-
receptive ears.
Similarly, Cassak and Heumann's arguments for a reconsidera-
tion of the general rule against informing the jury of sentencing infor-
mation are likely to fall on unreceptive ears in the circuit courts.
Blakely was revolutionary in its own right. By holding that the jury
must decide all facts legally essential to punishment, the Supreme
Court cast uncertainty on thousands of criminal sentences in which
judges had made some factual determinations in place of the jury at
the sentencing stage.149 Nevertheless, the language and posture of
the opinion suggests that Blakely's revolution will likely be limited by
the factual borderlines of the jury's authority. The Second Circuit's
sharp reaction to Judge Weinstein's suggestion that cases like Blakely
should open the door for juries to consider the sentencing implica-
tions of their decisions at the guilt phase demonstrates how judicial
adherence to the general rule allows for no haze along the fact-law
divide and shows how any expansion of the jury's authority that might
encourage it to step outside its factual jurisdiction and tinker along
the margins of fact and law can raise the ire of an appellate court and
all the antiauthoritarian sentiments that accompany it.15o
The Second Circuit's reaction in United States v. Polizzi to Judge
Weinstein's opinion presents an interesting case for understanding
the scope of federal jurisprudence on the jury.151 Judge Weinstein
was not arguing per se that the jury should be told of its authority to
nullify. He was simply arguing that more just verdicts would result if
146 See Brody, supra note 2, at 93 ("[T]he courts in Sparf and Dougherty wrongly struck
the balance by overstating the likelihood that informed juries will unjustly acquit and by
understating the harms to jurors and the justice system produced by the failure to provide
a nullification instruction.").
147 See United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
148 See id.
149 See Cassak & Heumann, supra note 2, at 468-72.
150 See United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2009); Polizzi, 549 F.
Supp. 2d at 426-32 (discussing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004)).
151 See 549 F. Supp. 2d at 404.
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the jury were informed of mandatory minimum sentences in certain
situations.152 According to Judge Weinstein, the lenity which a jury
could impose by knowing the sentence would allow the jury to per-
form its true function, rendering a verdict according to its conscience.
The Second Circuit, however, sharply criticized and dismissed Judge
Weinstein's suggestion by placing it into the 'jury nullification" issue
box and reciting the familiar line that juries decide questions of fact,
not law.153 Arguably, all the Second Circuit had to say was that exclud-
ing sentencing information from the jury was not an "abuse of discre-
tion" on the part of the district judge and therefore Judge Weinstein
erred in granting the defendant's new trial motion. 54 But, the
Court's strong exposition on Thomas and abhorrence for even the
slightest judicial encouragement of the jury to consider anything
other than the factual elements of guilt at the trial stage shows just
how pervasive the formalist jurisprudence is with regard to issues that
tinker with the distinction between law and fact.
Judge Weinstein's analysis raises important questions about how
much the jury should be cabined in its fact-finding function and sug-
gests that the formalistic distinction between fact and law encom-
passes too much. Giving the jury information about the mandatory
minimum sentence seems hardly as likely to devolve into anarchy as it
is to improve the jury's ability to make reasoned decisions based on its
duty to render verdicts according to conscience. It is hardly the same
as telling the jury that it can disregard the law altogether. Yet that is
how the Second Circuit saw it.155 Consistent with Judge Weinstein's
argument for instructing the jury about the minimum sentence, if the
right to nullify the law inheres in the jury, that right is by no means
absolute, but can be limited to ensure a fair trial and stave off anar-
chy-but only so long as that right is a right and not merely a power.
Although Judge Weinstein's reasoning shows the potential benefits to
the criminal justice system of a more functionalist approach to de-
152 See id. at 446.
153 See Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 162-63 ("Although jurors have the capacity to nullify, it is
not the proper role of courts to encourage nullification.").
154 Id. at 159.
155 Id. at 162 ("The only justification cited by the district court for the retrial order was
that some jurors might have voted for acquittal so as to nullify the application of the harsh
sentencing law had they been aware of the mandatory minimum sentence."). The Second
Circuit made sure to specify that its holding should not be taken to mean that a court may
never instruct a jury of the consequences of its verdict, even though it is not required to
instruct the jury of the sentencing consequences of its verdict. See id. at 160. The Second
Circuit explained, however, that the instruction is only proper when it would help the jury
determine the facts on the evidence, as where the district court or prosecutor misstates
that a defendant would "go free" if found not guilty by reason of insanity, but not when, as
here, that instruction would encourage the jury to go beyond the evidence to judge the
wisdom of the sentence itself. See id. at 162 (quoting Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S.
573, 587 (1994)).
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lineating the scope of the jury's authority, a formalistic division be-
tween judge and jury (and fact and law) continues to cabin the jury
from hearing anything with the potential to encourage leakage be-
tween the two domains-a division which likely comes at the expense
of more just verdicts.
VII
BRIDGING THE RHETORICAL DIVIDE
Recognizing and addressing the rhetorical divide created by
courts' disparate treatment of the jury will enhance the quality of the
jury nullification debate by bringing together proponents and oppo-
nents ofjury nullification and asking both to examine the foundations
of the assumptions they make about the jury in their arguments for
and against an expansion of the jury's authority. Commentators may
be baffled as to why, despite the strength of their arguments, many
courts do not yield to a more flexible approach to thejury's authority.
That is not to say that commentators have not made good arguments
questioning the wisdom of isolating the jury from all information that
might encourage extrafactual decisions, especially where a guilty ver-
dict could result in a minimum sentence of five, 156 ten,157 or twenty' 5 8
years, or even life,159 in prison.160 This Note has suggested that a con-
sequentialist argument for jury nullification, no matter how strong,
will likely fail when viewed through a lens colored by the rigid safety-
valve view of thejury. Proponents must therefore question the sound-
ness of the safety-valve view in addition to arguing the wisdom of their
own view instead of getting caught up in the rhetoric of appellate
courts that sound in functionalism and a return to the historical vision
of the jury on non-nullification issues.
156 See Polizi, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
157 See United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 907 (8th Cir. 2010).
158 See United States v. Seidel, No. 1:10-cr-71, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123058, at *4
(D.N.D. Nov. 5, 2010).
159 Id. at *2.
160 SeeJeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant After All? A Prescription for InformingJuries of
the Consequences of Conviction, 90 B.U. L. REv. 2223, 2224-26 (2010); Milton Heumann &
Lance Cassak, Not-So-Blissful Ignorance: Informing Jurors About Punishment in Mandatory Sen-
tencing Cases, 20 AM. CRIM. L. Rav. 343, 388 (1983); Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62
HASTINGs L.J. 1579, 1630 n.333 (2011) ("[I]n cases where the punishment, by any rational
measure, seems disproportionate to the crime, one wonders whether the jury would have
changed its verdict if it understood the consequences."); Kristen K. Sauer, Note, Informed
Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandatory Sentencing Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REv.
1232, 1260 (1995) (arguing that courts that deny a defendant's request to instruct the jury
on the sentencing consequences of a guilty verdict "fail to appreciate the long-acknowl-
edged political function of the jury as a check on potential governmental oppression" and




There are many cracks in the seams of the safety-valve view, and
proponents may attack both the wisdom of a deontological approach
to the jury's authority and the current health of the jury as the "safety
valve" of the criminal justice system. They may start by trying to show
that the result of giving the jury more authority would not be a del-
uge, but a more flexible system, and stressing how even a safety-valve
system cannot work properly if there are not from time to time adjust-
ments in its pipes.'61 Judge Weinstein's argument for instructing the
jury on the mandatory minimum sentence suggests that the safety-
valve view has cabined the jury at a very high price. Much of the most
ardent criticism of jury nullification comes from opinions that deal
with the issue of whether the jury should be informed of its right to
nullify.162 Such an instruction would be a watershed injury rights. An
argument may be made, however, that the strong antiauthoritarian
sentiment and strict formalism fostered by nullification-instruction
cases are ill-suited for other jury authority questions, including the
question of whether to inform the jury of mandatory minimum
sentences. Judge Leventhal stated that the jury would function best if
it came to the decision to nullify on its own on the view that to instruct
the jury of its power would be paramount to anarchy and undo the
right altogether.'6 3 But one might ask how the jury can properly serve
its role as a safety valve for extraordinary cases if it is not given the
opportunity to determine whether the case before it is extraordinary.
For example, a court cannot expect ajury to make a moral determina-
tion about a conviction if it does not have sufficient information to
161 In United States v. Simpson, the Ninth Circuit expressed a somewhat mixed view of
the jury, showing that, at least in theory, it might be amenable to a more utilitarian view or
would be willing to cabin the "nullification" label, allowing slack along the periphery of the
safety-valve view. 460 F.2d 515, 518-20 (9th Cir. 1972). AlthoughJudge Walter Raleigh Ely
held that the district court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury that it could acquit
the defendant irrespective of the evidence of guilt, the judge explained that "American
judges have generally avoided such interference as would divest juries of their power to
acquit an accused, even though the evidence of his guilt may be clear." Id. at 520. Because
Judge Ely believed this safeguard was adequate to ensure just verdicts, he saw no need to
depart from existing law. Although his explanation could be mere rhetoric, like Judge
Leventhal's apparent utilitarian balancing, his opinion differs from those in Dougherty and
Thomas in thatJudge Ely acknowledges the safety-valve view of the jury but leaves the door
open to the possibility thatjudges may need to impose additional measures in the future to
ensure that a jury is able to acquit against the evidence.
162 Richard St. John, Note, License to Nulify: The Democratic and Constitutional Deficiencies
of Authrized jury Lawmaking, 106 YALE L.J. 2563, 2564 (1997) ("Since Sparf judges and
commentators who have weighed in on the issue of jury nullification have typically asked
whether nullification either makes for good public policy or, even further, is mandated by
one or more provisions of the U.S. Constitution.").
163 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("[I]t is
pragmatically useful to structure instructions in such wise that the jury must feel strongly
about the values involved in the case, so strongly that it must itself identify the case as
establishing a call of high conscience, and must independently initiate and undertake an
act in contravention of the established instructions." (footnote omitted)).
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determine whether the sentence imposed by the law is oppressive or
unjust.164 Such an argument against the safety-valve view could pave
the way for utilitarianism by necessitating the follow-up question of
whether the jury is capable of distinguishing the extraordinary from
the mundane.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to commentators who suggest that recent Supreme
Court opinions on the jury represent a shift in jurisprudence from
formalism to functionalism and therefore justify a more expansive
role for the jury to determine both questions of law and fact, judicial
formalism is still very much intact with regard to jury nullification.
The jury's dual character as antiauthoritarian and antimajoritarian
underlies modern debate on jury nullification and reflects deep-
seated sentiments about the respective roles and competencies of
judges and jurors. In isolation, the Supreme Court's praise for the
jury as a protector of liberty in American democracy in non-nullifica-
tion cases might suggest a shift toward a more functionalist jurispru-
dence on the jury. However, the dichotomy in judicial treatment of
the jury between cases that involve jury nullification issues and cases
that do not suggests that circuit courts' unyielding commitment to the
bright-line distinction between judge and jury over questions of law
and fact is consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence on the jury.
Nullification opinions and non-nullification opinions remain sep-
arated by a strong rhetorical divide. Despite well-crafted arguments
that delegating more authority to the jury to decide questions of law
will foster a more just administration of the law, or "do[ ] justice in
light of the law" according to judge Weinstein,165 these arguments will
likely continue to be just that-good arguments trapped in the divide
between two different world views of the jury. Critics of the bright-line
division of power along the fact-law divide and proponents ofjury nul-
lification may continue to call upon higher courts' brazen praise for
the jury in non-nullification opinions and their occasional reliance on
consequentialist reasoning in nullification opinions to argue for a
more expansive role for the jury. Legal commentators like Arie Ru-
benstein and district court judges like judge Weinstein may try to
break holes in higher courts' constructions of the jury by emphasizing
the antiauthoritarian character of the jury that those courts have ap-
peared to recognize in their opinions. Yet Judge Weinstein's efforts
demonstrate that the reasoning of one side of the divide cannot so
easily be transported to the other.
164 See Morrison, supra note 160, at 1630 n.333.
165 Jack B. Weinstein, Consideringjury "Nullification": When May and Should ajury Reject
the Law to Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 239, 245 (1993).
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Although recent decisions expanding the jury's fact-finding au-
thority in cases like Blakely are significant in their own right, they are
unlikely to lead to a Supreme Court sanction of the jury's authority to
decide anything other than facts anytime soon. To the extent that
judicial use of antiauthoritarian language is limited to cases that do
not impinge on the judge's role as a decider of law, and to the extent
that consequentialist reasoning in opinions like Duncan is merely a
rhetorical tool that judges use to justify the current division of power
between judge and jury, arguments for an expansion of the jury's au-
thority beyond fact finding that are rooted in antiauthoritarian lan-
guage and consequentialist reasoning will not survive judicial
inspection because they overlook the antimajoritarian character of the
jury and continued formalism espoused by opinions that directly ad-
dress jury nullification.
